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Abstract—We consider a D2D-enabled cellular network where
user equipments (UEs) owned by rational users are incentivized
to form D2D pairs using tokens. They exchange tokens electron-
ically to “buy” and “sell” D2D services. Meanwhile the devices
have the ability to choose the transmission mode, i.e. receiving
data via cellular links or D2D links. Thus taking the different
benefits brought by diverse traffic types as a prior, the UEs
can utilize their tokens more efficiently via transmission mode
selection. In this paper, the optimal transmission mode selection
strategy as well as token collection policy are investigated to max-
imize the long-term utility in the dynamic network environment.
The optimal policy is proved to be a threshold strategy, and the
thresholds have a monotonicity property. Numerical simulations
verify our observations and the gain from transmission mode
selection is observed.
I. INTRODUCTION
To meet the dramatically increasing traffic demand and
provide better user experience, the device-to-device (D2D)
communication has been proposed recently. This technology,
which enables direct communication between two mobile
users in proximity, has attracted attention in both industry and
academic [1]–[3]. The adoption of D2D communication allows
high-rate, low-delay and low-power transmissions [4].
Recent researches on D2D communication mainly focus on
developing various optimization and game theory frameworks
for mode selection, resource allocation or interference manage-
ment in order to maximize throughput or to improve energy
efficiency [5]–[7]. These studies are based on the assumption
that there are many devices already in D2D communication
mode. However, this assumption needs to be re-examined in
realistic scenarios. The UEs are possessed by self-interested
users who aim to maximize their individual utilities. In prac-
tice, they would have no incentive to provide D2D service
unless receiving satisfactory rewards. Therefore, it is crucial
to design a proper incentive mechanism to encourage UEs to
form D2D pairs [8].
In this paper, we design a token-based incentive system. In
such system, UEs pay tokens to or gain tokens from other
UEs in exchange for D2D service. Some previous works
have investigated the token system on cooperative relaying
in cellular networks [9], [10]. In [9], authors designed a
token incentive scheme from the perspective of a system
designer. In [10], authors investigated how UEs can learn the
token gathering strategies online. However, neither of them
takes into account how UEs make decisions when facing two
alternatives, i.e. D2D link versus cellular link. The former
one has to consume tokens while the latter one does not. In
practice, there are various types of traffic which will result
in different benefits in D2D communication. If the decision
on transmission mode selection is considered, tokens can be
utilized more efficiently. Intuitively, the UE could spend more
tokens on more beneficial traffic types to improve his utility.
Therefore, it is crucial to answer the question “when to use
tokens” or “which transmission mode to choose” equivalently.
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first attempt in
literature to investigate token consuming policy in the token
system designed for D2D-enabled cellular networks.
In this paper, we consider a D2D-enabled cellular network
where UEs are incentivized to form D2D pair using tokens.
We formulate a Markov decision process (MDP) model to
characterize the interaction between each UE and environment.
i.e. transmission mode selection policy and token collection
strategy. When traffic arrives, a UE needs to first choose the
transmission mode, and then determines whether to accept
D2D request if idle. The objective of a UE is to maximize his
long-term utility, which is defined as the difference between
the benefit he obtains when receiving data through D2D
link and the cost he pays when providing D2D service.
Furthermore, the structure of the optimal policy is investigated.
Unlike [10], [11], the optimal policy is analytically proved to
be threshold in the number of the tokes instead of just taking
this property as an assumption. Moreover, it turns out that the
threshold increases as a function of the benefits of the traffic
types. The numerical simulations verify our observations and
the gain from transmission mode selection is observed.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
the system model is discussed. In Section III, the MDP model
for individual UE’s decision problem is developed. In Section
IV, we investigate the structure of the optimal policy. Section
V gives some numerical simulation results, and finally section
VI concludes this paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Network Model
In this paper, we consider a D2D-enabled wireless cellu-
lar network and the slot based system is adopted. At each
slot, when traffic arrives, such as transferring a file, the UE
will choose the transmission mode and start a transmission
procedure. The transmission modes include cellular mode and
D2D mode. The former mode corresponds to the conventional
cellular communication and the latter mode represents D2D
communication. According to the given policy as well as the
available information, the decision is made at the beginning
of each slot. Note that each slot may last several seconds and
each type of traffic may last multiple slots.
Without loss of generality, we assume that for any type,
D2D mode can always obtain higher benefit than cellular
mode. It is reasonable due to lower power consumption and
higher throughput of D2D link. Suppose the utility for cellular
mode is 0 for convenience. Considering different requirements
for different traffic types, we define the specific utility for each
type of traffic according to its characteristics. There are some
widely used classification in literature under various practical
consideration. Basically, in terms of throughput requirements,
traffic can be divided into two types, stream traffic and elastic
traffic [12]. Besides, traffic can also be classified as video
traffic, audio traffic and file transfer according to the types of
applications [13].
Similar to [14], we do not specify a concrete traffic clas-
sification. Instead, we assume there are N types of traffic
and the traffic type set is denoted as So = {s1, s2, · · · , sN}.
Especially, we regard s0 as a special type of traffic, namely,
the idle state. Hence we can define the extended traffic type
set as S = So ∪ {s0}. The stationary probability of each type
s ∈ S is p(s) with 0 < p(s) < 1 and
∑
s∈S p(s) = 1. We
denote bs as the benefit of D2D mode for traffic type s ∈ S
o.
Moreover, we assume that 0 < bs1 < bs2 < · · · < bsN .
B. Token System
Although D2D communication has multiple advantages, the
UEs are generally reluctant to provide D2D service since this
incurs cost and provides them with no reward. To overcome
this difficulty, we use token system to incentive UEs to
accept D2D requests. Specifically, a UE must spend tokens in
exchange for receiving data through D2D link, and can only
earn tokens by providing D2D service for other UEs. Because
the device works in half-duplex mode and the traffic demand
must be met, so it is reasonable to assume that only in idle
state, a UE can provide D2D transmission service.
The token system has many advantages [9]. First, there is no
extra payment exchange involved, which avoids many financial
problems associated with other monetary incentive schemes.
Second, no personal information exchange is required, which
allows secure implementation. Recently, several techniques
which could enable electronic token transaction, have been
proposed [15]. We assume that our token system is imple-
mented using such technologies.
The entire system is described as follows. Consider UE j
decides to start a D2D transmission. At this point, UE j sends a
D2D request to the selected UE j∗ under a predefined criterion.
If the request is accepted, UE j will pay one token to UE j∗
through token exchange system. Otherwise, the UE j will seek
another UE to forward his traffic. If there is no UE accepting
TABLE I: Action spaces
State (s, k) Action space Action Physical meanings
s 6= s0 AM
aM = 0 choose cellular mode
aM = 1 choose D2D mode
s = s0 AR
aR = 0 accept any D2D request
aR = 1 refuse any D2D request
the request, UE j has to deliver the data through BS. Moreover,
we assume that the UE can serve only one UE simultaneously.
Therefore, an idle UE will choose only one or reject all when
he receives multiple D2D requests.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we formulate the optimal policy for a UE
based on MDP model. When a UE has no token, he has no
choice but to choose cellular mode. In addition, a UE would
spend as many tokens as possible on the traffic types with high
utility in order to maximize his utility. Therefore, it is needed
to investigate the optimal strategy, which includes transmission
mode selection policy and token collection strategy.
A. State and Action Spaces
Token holding state: At any given slot t, the UE holds
kt ∈ K = {0, 1, · · · ,K} tokens, where K is the maximal
number of tokens allowed in the system.
Traffic type state: At different slots, the UE may have
different type of traffic. Denote the type of traffic in slot t
as st ∈ S. Assume that the traffic types of different slots are
independent mutually.
The state parameters defined above can be used to describe
the UE’s private information at slot t. Hence, let Ωt = (st, kt)
denote the state of the UE at slot t.
When s 6= s0, which means a specified traffic arrives, the
UE can take an action to choose D2D mode or cellular mode.
We denote the action taken when s 6= s0 as aM ∈ AM =
{0, 1}. aM = 0 and aM = 1 represent the cellular mode and
D2D mode, respectively.
When s = s0, the UE can decide whether to accept D2D
requests from other UEs. In this situation, we denote the action
taken as aR ∈ AR = {0, 1}. aR = 0 is the action that the UE
chooses to accept the D2D request to earn one token, and aR =
1 represents the action that the UE refuses to provide D2D
service for other UEs. Putting all these together, the action
space A(s, k) is shown in Table.I.
B. Transition Probability
Now we discuss the state transition probability. Let
P{(s′, k′)|(s, k), a} denote the state transition probability
function, which represents the probability that the UE transfers
from state Ω = (s, k) to state Ω′ = (s′, k′) depending on the
action a.
Because the D2D request may not be accepted and a UE
may not receive any D2D requests even if he takes the action
aR = 0, the state transition is influenced by the complicated
varying environment. We use a stochastic model to describe
the environmental dynamics. The associated environmental
TABLE II: Environmental factors
Parameters Physical meanings
p probability of receiving D2D requests
q probability of its D2D request being accepted
factors are shown in Table.II. Specifically, we use 0 < p < 1
to denote the probability of receiving D2D requests when the
UE takes the action aR = 0, and use 0 < q < 1 to denote the
probability of the D2D request being accepted when the UE
takes the action aM = 1. These parameters are unknown a
priori, but can be learned from history or other reinforcement
learning methods [16], such as Q-learning.
Consequently, the state transition probability is presented in
(1). We will explain it in detail later.
P{(s′, k′)|(s, k), a} =

p(s′){(1− aM ) + aM (1− q)} s 6= s0, k > 0, k
′ = k
p(s′)qaM s 6= s0, k > 0, k
′ = k − 1
p(s′) s 6= s0, k = 0, k
′ = k
p(s′){aR + (1− aR)(1 − p)} s = s0, k < K, k
′ = k
p(s′)p(1− aR) s = s0, k < K, k
′ = k + 1
p(s′) s = s0, k = K, k
′ = k
0 otherwise
.
(1)
At first, we consider the case in which s 6= s0 thus a =
aM ∈ AM . If k > 0, the number of tokens can decrease by
one or stay unchanged depending on the selected action. There
are two possibilities for the transition from (s, k) to (s′, k):
the first situation is that the UE takes the action aM = 0,
indicating P{(s′, k)|(s, k), aM = 0} = p(s
′); the other one
suggests that the D2D request is rejected by all potential UEs
while the UE takes the action aM = 1, and it corresponds
to P{(s′, k)|(s, k), aM = 1} = p(s
′)(1 − q). Therefore, we
obtain P{(s′, k)|(s, k), aM} = p(s
′){(1− aM ) + aM (1− q)}
when putting them together. Transition from (s, k) to (s′, k−1)
will happen only when the UE takes the action aM = 1 and
the D2D request is accepted. Thus, the transition probability
is p(s′)qaM , which means that the transition is possible only
when aM = 1. Besides, the probability of transition from
(s, 0) to (s′, 0) is p(s′) no matter which action is taken
since the action aM = 1 is meaningless here. Otherwise the
transition probability is zero. Following the similar argument,
we can get the transition probability when the UE is idle.
C. Reward
When the UE provides D2D service for another UE, the cost
incurred is defined as c. The cost can be thought as the average
cost of all possible D2D transmissions because we only care
about the average utility in our model. Thus, we can get the
expected reward µ(s, k, a) depending on state (s, k) and action
a as follows.
E{µ(s, k, a)} =
{
−cp(1− aR) s = s0
qaMbsI(k > 0) s 6= s0
. (2)
where E{·} is the expectation and I(·) is the indicator func-
tion.
D. Optimization Problem Formulation
A policy π is defined as a function to specify the action
π(s, k) to be taken for the state (s, k). When s = s0,
π(s, k) represents the transmission mode selection policy and
it corresponds to token collection policy when s 6= s0. The
expected utility obtained by executing policy π starting at state
(s0, k0) is given by
V pi(s0, k0) = E{
∞∑
t=0
βtµ(st, kt, π(st, kt))}, (3)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discounted factor.
Our goal is to find the optimal policy π∗ to maximize the
expected utility, which can be expressed as the optimization
problem shown in (4).
π∗ = argmax
pi
V pi(s0, k0). (4)
Value iteration or policy iteration [17] can be used to obtain
the optimal policy when p and q are known. When these
environmental parameters are unknown, Q-learning [16] can
be adopted.
IV. OPTIMAL POLICY FOR A SINGLE UE
In this section, we investigate the structure of optimal policy.
We will prove that the optimal policy is threshold. In [9], this
property is proved only for one-dimensional state case, but a
two-dimensional state case is analyzed here.
Let V ∗(s, k) = V pi
∗
(s, k) for brevity. It is given by the
solution of Bellman equation shown in (5) [17].
V ∗(s, k) =
max
a∈A(s,k)
{
E{µ(s, k, a)}+ β
∑
s′∈S
p(s′, k′|s, k, a)V ∗(s, k)
}
.
(5)
The optimal policy π∗(s, k) is the action a ∈ A(s, k) to
maximize the right hand side of Bellman equation. It is easy to
find out that π∗(s, 0) = 0(s 6= s0) and π
∗(s0,K) = 1. From
the Bellman equation, it turns out that the optimal strategy has
the following one-shot deviation property [9].
Lemma 1: The optimal strategy π∗ has following property:
(1) For s 6= s0, k > 0, π
∗(s, k) = 0 if and only if
β
∑
s′∈S
p(s′) {V ∗(s′, k)− V ∗(s′, k − 1)} ≥ bs. (6)
(2) For s = s0, k < K , π
∗(s, k) = 0 if and only if
β
∑
s′∈S
p(s′) {V ∗(s′, k + 1)− V ∗(s′, k)} ≥ c. (7)
Proof: For s 6= s0, k > 0, based on Bellman equation (5),
π∗(s, k) = 0 if and only if
qaM bs + β
∑
s′∈S
p(s′, k′|s, k, aM )V
∗(s, k)
∣∣∣
aM=0
≥ qaM bs+
β
∑
s′∈S
p(s′, k′|s, k, aM )V
∗(s, k)
∣∣∣
aM=1
.
Algorithm 1 Value Iteration Algorithm
Initialize: V 0(s, k) = 0, ∀s ∈ S, ∀k ∈ K
Loop:
1 Update the policy {πn+1(s, k)}:
Set πn+1(s, 0) = 0(s 6= s0) and π
n+1(s0,K) = 1
(1) For s 6= s0, if
β
∑
s′∈S
p(s′) {V n(s′, k)− V n(s′, k − 1)} ≥ bs.
then πn+1(s, k) = 0 and πn+1(s, k) = 1 otherwise.
(2) For s = s0, if
β
∑
s′∈S
p(s′) {V n(s′, k + 1)− V n(s′, k)} ≥ c.
then πn+1(s, k) = 0 and πn+1(s, k) = 1 otherwise.
2 Update the utility function {V n+1(s, k)}:
V n+1(s, k) =E{µ(s, k, πn+1(s, k))}+
β
∑
s′∈S
p(s′, k′|s, k, πn+1(s, k))V n(s, k)
Until: maxs,k |V
n+1(s, k)− V n(s, k)| < ǫ
Using the transition probability in (1), we can obtain the
following inequality.
β
∑
s′∈S
p(s′)V ∗(s′, k) ≥ qbs + β
∑
s′∈S
p(s′){(1− q)V ∗(s′, k)+
qV ∗(s′, k − 1)}.
After some simple algebraic operations, inequality (6) can be
verified.
Following the similar argument, we can prove the second
part of Lemma 1.
The LHS of (6) is the opportunity cost for using one token at
this point and the RHS of (6) is the immediate utility brought
by this action. Since the opportunity cost is higher than the
immediate utility, the UE will choose aM = 0, namely cellular
mode. We can interpret (7) in a similar way.
Here we assume that the the environmental factors p and
q are known as a prior. Thus the value iteration algorithm
can be used to obtain the optimal policy, which is depicted in
Algorithm 1.
Now we show the marginal decrease of the utility function
V n(s, k) at each iteration of Algorithm 1. This property is
depicted in Theorem 1 in detail.
Theorem 1 (The marginal diminishing utility): At each
iteration of Algorithm 1, the following inequality holds:
V n(s, k+1)−V n(s, k) ≤ V n(s, k)−V n(s, k−1), n ≥ 0. (8)
Proof: We will use induction to show that (8) holds for
n ≥ 0.
1) Due to the initiation step of Algorithm 1, (8) holds for
all n = 0.
2) Suppose the induction hypothesis holds for some n ≥ 0.
In order to prove (8) holds for n+ 1, the proof includes two
parts. At first we will show that πn+1(s, k) has threshold
structure, which will be used to verify (8) for n + 1 in
the second part. And for the sake of notational conciseness,
we define ∆n(k) ,
∑
s′∈S p(s
′)V n(s′, k + 1), and then the
following inequality holds by using the induction hypothesis:
∆n(s, k + 1)−∆n(s, k) ≤ ∆n(s, k)−∆n(s, k − 1). (9)
We first show the threshold structure of πn+1(s, k). It suf-
fices to prove that if πn+1(s, k+1) = 0, then πn+1(s, k) = 0.
When s 6= s0, given the step 2 of the algorithm and using (9),
we get the inequality∆(k)−∆(k−1) ≥ ∆(k+1)−∆(k) ≥ bs,
so πn+1(s, k) = 0. Similarly, we can prove it when s = s0.
Next we will prove that given the utility function obtained
in step 2 of the algorithm, (8) holds for n+ 1.
When s 6= s0, we only need to consider four cases due to
the threshold structure of the policy.
Case 1: πn+1(s, k − 1) = πn+1(s, k) = 0 and πn+1(s, k +
1) = 1. Thus
V n+1(s, k − 1) = ∆n(k − 1),
V n+1(s, k) = ∆n(k),
V n+1(s, k + 1) = qbs + q∆
n(k) + (1− q)∆n(k + 1).
Then, we can get:
V n+1(s, k + 1)− V n+1(s, k)
=bsq + (1 − q){∆(k + 1)−∆(k)}
(a)
≤ q{∆(k)−∆(k − 1)}+ (1− q){∆(k + 1)−∆(k)}
≤∆(k)−∆(k − 1)
=V n+1(s, k)− V n+1(s, k − 1).
Using the fact that πn+1(s, k) = 0 amounts to∆n(k)−∆n(k−
1) ≤ bs, we can obtain inequality (a).
Case 2: πn+1(s, k − 1) = 0 and πn+1(s, k) = πn+1(s, k +
1) = 1. Thus
V n+1(s, k − 1) = ∆n(k − 1),
V n+1(s, k) = bs + q∆
n(k − 1) + (1− q)∆n(k),
V n+1(s, k + 1) = qbs + q∆
n(k) + (1− q)∆n(k + 1).
Then, the following inequality can be obtained:
V n+1(s, k)− V n(s, k − 1)
=qbs − q{∆(k)−∆(k − 1)}+ {∆(k)−∆(k − 1)}
(a)
≥∆(k)−∆(k − 1).
Inequality (a) holds because when πn+1(s, k) = 1, then
∆n(k)−∆n(k − 1) ≥ bs. Moveover, we can find out that:
V n+1(s, k + 1)− V n(s, k)
=q∆(k)−∆(k − 1) + (1− q)∆(k + 1)−∆(k)
≤∆(k)−∆(k − 1).
Therefore, it is obvious that (8) holds for n+1 in this situation.
For the case where πn+1(s, k − 1) = πn+1(s, k) =
πn+1(s, k + 1) = 0 or πn+1(s, k − 1) = πn+1(s, k) =
πn+1(s, k + 1) = 1, it is easy to verify the inequality.
Similarly, we can verify the inequality V n+1(s, k + 1) −
V n+1(s, k) ≤ V n+1(s, k)− V n+1(s, k − 1) when s = s0.
Remark 1: Theorem 1 indicates that the marginal reward of
owning an additional token decreases. The incentive of holding
a token is that the UE can use the token to request D2D service
to improve his utility. However, keeping tokens has inherent
risk modeled by β, which exponentially “discounts” future
rewards.
Furthermore, from the proof of Theorem 1, we can find an
important fact that the optimal policy is a threshold strategy
in k for a given traffic type.
Proposition 1 (Threshold structure): The optimal policy is a
threshold strategy when the traffic type is given. Specifically,
there exits a constant Kth(s) depending on the type of traffic
s ∈ S, such that:
π∗(s, k) =
{
0 k < Kth(s)
1 k ≥ Kth(s)
. (10)
Proof: We only consider the case when s 6= s0 here and
the proof is similar when s = s0. Recall that π
∗(s, 0) = 0(s 6=
s0), therefore it is sufficient to show that if π
∗(s, k) = 1(k ≥
1, s 6= s0), then π
∗(s, k + 1) = 1.
Suppose π∗(s, k) = 0(s 6= s0). According to Lemma 1, we
find out that
β
∑
s′∈S
p(s′) {V ∗(s′, k)− V ∗(s′, k − 1)} ≤ bs.
Additionally, Theorem 1 implies that V ∗(s′, k + 1) −
V ∗(s′, k) ≤ V ∗(s′, k)− V ∗(s′, k − 1). Therefore, we have
β
∑
s′∈S
p(s′) {V ∗(s′, k + 1)− V ∗(s′, k)} ≤ bs,
which implies that π∗(s, k + 1) = 1.
Intuitively, for traffic type s 6= s0, if the UE chooses D2D
mode when owning k tokens, he is more likely to still choose
D2D mode when more tokens is available. In fact, many re-
search works make this assumption due to its simplicity when
they build their models. Unlike these works, we analytically
prove that optimal policy has a threshold structure instead
of just assuming this property without rigorously proving its
optimality.
Remark 2: According to Proposition 1, only |S| thresholds
is needed to define the optimal policy. Therefore, the size of
search space would be significantly reduced due to the small
amount of traffic types. Note that this property still holds when
the traffic types of adjacent slots are dependent.
Moreover, it turns out that the thresholds have a monotonic-
ity property.
Proposition 2 (Monotonicity): If bi < bj(i, j 6= s0), then
Kth(j) ≤ Kth(i) where Kth(s) is the threshold defined in
Proposition 1.
Proof: It is sufficient to verify that if bi < bj(i, j 6= s0)
and π∗(j, k) = 0, then π∗(i, k) = 0. According to Lemma 1,
we can find out that
∑
s′∈S p(s
′)V n(s′, k)− V n(s′, k − 1) ≥
bj ≥ bi, and thus we can get π
∗(i, k) = 0 using the sufficient
condition for the optimal policy.
Proposition 2 implies that the more beneficial traffic types
have higher probability to be served in D2D mode due to the
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Fig. 2: Thresholds with different parameters
lower threshold. It means that the UE will spend more tokens
on those traffic types. Consequently, the UE’s long-term utility
is improved.
V. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
In this section, we give simulations to verify the analyzed
results. At first, we present several numerical results to show
the structure of the optimal policy and illustrate the behavior
of the optimal threshold Kth(s)(s 6= s0) with respect to other
parameters. We assume that s1, s2, s3, s4 belongs to S
o and
ps0 = ps1 = ps2 = ps3 = ps4 = 0.2. The benefits of these
traffic types are 3, 4, 5, 6, respectively, the cost c = 1 and
K = 20. These parameters are set for illustration purpose,
and a more realistic scenario will be considered later.
The optimal policy is given Fig.1. As indicated in Propo-
sition 1, the optimal policy is threshold in the token state k.
Fig.2a shows the thresholds vary with respect to the discount
factor β. Note that the threshold for the most beneficial
traffic type is always one, which is omitted here. The optimal
threshold is non-decreasing in β. It is because, if a UE is far-
sighted, he intends to wait for a better chance to consume
tokens, i.e. more beneficial traffic types, and thus has less
incentive to use tokens if the benefit of the current traffic is
low. Fig.2b illustrates the thresholds vary with respect to the
environmental factor p. The optimal threshold decreases as p
increases. This happens allowing for being easier to collect
tokens as p increases, which leads to more incentive for the
UE to use tokens albeit bs is low. Fig.2c shows the variation
of the thresholds with respect to the environmental factor q.
The optimal threshold decreases as q decreases, since that the
D2D request is seldom accepted when q is low, and thus a
UE has more incentive to take every opportunity to seek D2D
service. Additionally, as proved in Proposition 2, the threshold
decreases with the increase in benefit bs.
Furthermore, we give simulations to show the gain obtained
from transmission mode selection. A more realistic scenario
is considered, where traffic is divided into two types: sv-video
traffic and se-elastic traffic. Thus the extended traffic type set
is denoted as S = {s0, sv, se}. The mean opinion score (MOS)
is often used as a subjective measure of the network quality
in literature. The benefit of each traffic type in our simulation
is defined as the difference in the MOS obtained by two
transmission modes. The MOS estimations of two traffic types
depend on experienced Peak Signal-to-Noise-Ratio (PSNR)
Psnr and throughput θ, respectively. They are expressed as
follows [14]:
Qsv (Psnr) = 4.5−
3.5
1 + exp(b1(Psnr − b2))
, (11)
Qse(θ) = b3 log(b4θ), (12)
where b1 = 1, b2 = 5, b3 = 2.6949 and b4 = 0.0235. In our
simulations, Psnr = 10db and θ = 1500kbps for D2D mode.
Meanwhile, Psnr = 5db and θ = 1000kbps for cellular mode.
Moreover, the stationary probability is set as ps0 = 0.3, psv =
0.2 and pse = 0.5. Let the environmental factors p = q = 0.8
and they are known as a prior. The discount factor β is set to
be 0.99 and the cost c is set to be 0.4. The simulation runs
106 slots.
A greedy policy is considered for comparison. We assume
that the UE will choose D2D mode when having any tokens,
and the goal of this policy is to optimize the token collection
strategy only. Fig.3a shows the distribution of token usage over
different traffic types. We can find out that the distribution
is proportional to ps when the greedy policy in executed. In
contrast, since the different benefits of different traffic types
are distinguished, more tokens are spent on the more beneficial
traffic types and the number of tokens spent on the least bene-
ficial traffic type se dramatically decreases. Fig.3b presents the
average utilities of two policy with different discount factor β.
The utilities of both policy increase with increasing β due to
the fact users with higher β are more far-sighted. Moreover,
the gain obtained by considering transmission mode selection
can be observed. However, the gap tends towards zero when
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β is small. That’s because the UE with low β is myopia so
that he inclines to spend token no matter the traffic type is,
which is similar to the greedy policy. Besides, the emergence
of plateau of the curves is because the variation of β is not
large enough to change the policy.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we consider a D2D-enabled cellular network
where selfish UEs are incentivized to form D2D pairs using
tokens. We formulate a MDP model to characterize UE’s
behavior including transmission mode selection strategy as
well as token collection policy. Moreover, we prove that the
optimal strategy is threshold in the token state and show that
the threshold increases as a function of the benefits related to
the the traffic types. In our future work, we will explore the
optimal selection of the maximum number of tokens so that the
incentive mechanism can approach the altruism mechanism.
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